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THE ART OF SALT
Congress Should Sprinkle Some SALT on the Federal Courts
by Arthur R. Rosen and Hayes R. Holderness
Observers of the state and local tax world 
regularly note the seemingly irresponsible actions 
so often taken by state revenue agencies, by state 
courts, and by state legislatures1 — a few recent 
examples of states acting badly are set forth below. 
In many ways federal law has encouraged these 
types of actions by placing limited checks on the 
states. The federal Tax Injunction Act (TIA)2 and 
the common law comity doctrine keep federal 
courts off the states’ backs. Also, the Supreme 
Court’s South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc.3 decision and 
its Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Association4 decision, in which state legislatures 
were freed from congressional restraints 
regarding the enactment of state gambling 
statutes, will likely encourage states to push back 
on virtually any federal effort in the interstate tax 
arena. Adding fuel to this fire, most of the states 
are now, in Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt,5 seeking 
freedom from another check on their actions, by 
asking the Supreme Court to overturn precedent 
allowing state government actors to be sued in 
sister state courts (this is similar to 
Massachusetts’s efforts in Crutchfield Corp. v. 
Harding6). State victories in these cases would 
surely fan the flames of unchecked state behavior 
into a veritable conflagration. There is, however, 
the glimmer of a fire extinguisher at the end of the 
tunnel — Congress could establish stronger 
federal checks on state tax actions by opening the 
federal courts to interstate taxpayers.
I. States Acting Badly
A. Revenue Agencies
Examples of state tax auditors and revenue 
agency managers acting improperly (or, perhaps 
more generously, “acting ulta vires”) abound. 
Every state tax practitioner knows, for instance, 
the virtually universal use of penalties, or the 
threat of penalty imposition, as a way to pressure 
taxpayers into settling audits. As a practical 
matter, it seems totally relevant that the operative 
statutes clearly provide that the penalties are to be 
imposed only if the taxpayer fails to show that it 
had acted reasonably in completing the tax return, 
filing the return, or paying the tax (although 
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1
See, e.g., Mark W. Eidman and Arthur R. Rosen, “Non-Legislated Tax 
Legislation,” State Tax Notes, Jan. 24, 2011, p. 301.
2
28 U.S.C. section 1341.
3
South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., 585 U. S. __ (2018).
4
Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 543 U.S. __ (2018).
5
Franchise Tax Board of State of California v. Hyatt, 407 P.3d 717 (Nev. 
2017), cert. granted, Dkt. No. 17-1299 (U.S. June 28, 2018).
6
Crutchfield Corp. v. Harding, No. CL17001145-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2018).
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penalty statutes are often worded in the opposite 
way: initial penalty imposition required, but 
abatement, waiving, or cancellation of the 
penalties on the showing of reasonable cause). 
The misuse of penalties by state tax auditors is so 
common and widespread that practitioners are 
fully shocked when the threat of penalties is not in 
the auditors’ initial salvo.
At a more senior level, state tax administrators 
appear, from time to time, to turn a blind eye to 
inappropriate and irresponsible behavior of 
midlevel managers in their agencies. For example, 
the revenue agency in one mid-Atlantic state 
takes the same untenable positions — year after 
year — and then closes the case with the taxpayer 
paying a mere token percentage of the amount 
sought in the statutory notice. Although one of us 
has considered bringing Civil Rights Act section 
1983 action against this agency’s executives, 
developments in this area regarding personal 
liability of state government officials have 
dissuaded the client from pursuing that route.7
One of those positions from that mid-Atlantic 
state,8 that market-based sourcing rather than 
cost-of-performance is the appropriate sourcing 
rule for receipts from the performance of services, 
is clearly wrong because (1) the state’s legislature 
passed market-based sourcing explicitly on a 
prospective-only basis (for years after those in 
audit for several taxpayers) and (2) abundant case 
law in the state mandates the use of cost of 
performance. When protested to the first 
“independent” forum, the taxpayers’ 
representatives are told — we have actually heard 
this in more than one case — that there is too 
much evidence to review so the decision will 
simply sustain the statutory notice!
B. State Courts
State revenue agencies are not the only state 
actors acting poorly; state courts have also 
reached tenuous conclusions in cases involving 
state taxes. The alternative apportionment cases 
of Equifax Inc. v. Mississippi Department of Revenue9 
and Vodafone Americas Holdings Inc. v. Roberts10 
offer examples.
In 2013 the Mississippi Supreme Court 
overturned the Mississippi Court of Appeals and 
upheld an assessment and penalties against 
Equifax. Equifax’s error? It used the cost-of-
performance apportionment method for services 
mandated by regulations promulgated under 
Mississippi law. Because Equifax performed its 
services in Georgia, not Mississippi, its income 
was apportioned to Georgia and was thus not 
subject to Mississippi tax. On audit, the 
Mississippi Department of Revenue applied an 
alternative method of apportionment (using 
market-based sourcing) to determine Equifax’s 
income subject to tax, without providing any 
justification for its selection of the alternative 
apportionment method. Unsurprisingly, this 
action resulted in substantial additional tax for 
Equifax, as well as penalties.
Even worse, in upholding the assessment and 
penalties, Equifax suffered numerous procedural 
abuses. While its protest was before the 
department, Equifax had no right of discovery or 
investigation to determine the basis for the 
assessment. Then, at the trial court level, Equifax 
was deprived of a right of de novo review by the 
trier of fact, despite the relevant statute calling for 
de novo review. Even under an arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review, the trial court 
affirmed the penalty assessment even though the 
department stipulated that Equifax had prepared 
its returns in accordance with the mandated 
apportionment method. The trial court also did 
not require the department to demonstrate any 
justification for prescribing an alternative 
apportionment formula for Equifax, but instead 
placed the burden on Equifax to prove that the 
choice of an alternative apportionment formula 
was in error. The Mississippi Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court’s rulings. Equifax was 
effectively penalized and taxed for following the 
7
See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“The doctrine of 
qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known.’”).
8
Don’t get us started on another common and repeated 
mischaracterization of the law by some state revenue authorities — that 
cloud computing services are the sale of tangible personal property. See, 
e.g., Rosen and Hayes R. Holderness, “Cloud Computing: 1.5 Steps 
Forward, 2 Steps Back,” State Tax Notes, June 26, 2017, p. 1257.
9
Equifax Inc. v. Mississippi Department of Revenue, 125 So. 3d 36 (Miss. 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2872 (2014).
10
Vodafone Americas Holdings Inc. v. Roberts, 486 S.W.3d 496 (Tenn. 
2016).
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statute and failing to predict that the department 
would use an alternative apportionment method. 
Even if Equifax could have predicted the 
department’s actions, the Mississippi Supreme 
Court still would have placed the burden on 
Equifax to show that the use of alternative 
apportionment was not warranted. One would 
have expected that following the statute would be 
the default, and that the department would have 
to prove the necessity of an alternative method. 
The Mississippi Legislature shared that 
expectation, rewriting the law after Equifax to 
clearly place the burden on the department in 
future situations like this one.11
The story in Vodafone is similar. In that case, 
the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the 
Tennessee Department of Revenue’s use of 
alternative apportionment — also to impose 
market-based sourcing on a service provider — to 
override the statutory cost-of-performance 
method that the taxpayer, Vodafone, attempted to 
use. Other than to claim that the statutory method 
resulted in less revenue for Tennessee than the 
alternative method (which, according to the 
commissioner, was “straightforward and 
conceptually satisfying,” in contrast to the “not so 
straightforward” statutory method), the 
department failed to show that the statutory 
formula did not reflect the taxpayer’s in-state 
activities. Instead of requiring the department to 
make its case more fully (and perhaps blinded by 
sympathies for state revenue), the court left 
Vodafone to prove that the department’s action 
was unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. 
Even more troubling, the Vodafone court justified 
its conclusion by relying on a 2009 Tennessee 
Court of Appeals case, BellSouth Advertising & 
Publishing Corp. v. Chumley,12 that also failed to 
require the department to justify its imposition of 
alternative apportionment beyond merely 
claiming that alternative apportionment raised 
more money for the state.13
Those decisions lead one to suspect a form of 
“judicial drift” occurs, causing state judges to be 
heavily biased toward supporting the position of 
the state revenue agencies.14 An “us versus them” 
attitude, which seems to develop because state 
court judges are part of their states’ government 
environment and culture, is not conducive to 
reaching decisions in tax cases that faithfully 
apply the law. Sometimes taxpayers get it wrong, 
but sometimes state revenue agencies also get it 
wrong. At a minimum, one would expect that 
“more revenue” would not suffice as a basis for 
statutory interpretation and application.
C. State Legislatures
Two recent state legislative actions 
demonstrate that those bodies are feeling 
increasingly less constrained by some basic legal 
principles and concepts of fairness.
In Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. 
Wynne,15 the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that a 
portion of the Maryland tax scheme that limited 
the tax credit that residents could take against 
their Maryland local taxes was unconstitutional; 
the Maryland General Assembly then, rubbing 
salt right into that interstate discrimination 
wound, enacted a statute severely limiting the 
interest rate taxpayers would be paid on refunds 
of those credit amounts. Fortunately, the 
Maryland Tax Court, in Wynne v. Comptroller of 
Maryland,16 found that an interest limitation on 
just those refunds violated the same 
constitutional anti-discrimination rule that the 
initial tax credit statute had violated. This rare but 
welcome taxpayer victory in the Maryland Tax 
Court perhaps is due to the high profile of the case 
and clear injustice of the Maryland legislature’s 
action (the tax court needed only three brief 
paragraphs to decide the case).
A deeper concern, however, arises when one 
considers the legislation enacted, or being 
considered, by numerous state legislatures in 
11
See Mississippi H.B. 799 (effective Jan. 1, 2015).
12
BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Chumley, 308 S.W.3d 350 
(Tenn. App. 2009).
13
See Rosen and Julie M. Skelton, “Desperately Seeking State Tax 
Fairness: The Need for Federal Adjudication,” State Tax Notes, Aug. 8, 
2011, p. 357.
14
Cf. Lee Epstein et al., “Ideological Drift among Supreme Court 
Justices: Who, When, and How Important,” 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1483 
(2007) (discussing the shift in ideology of Supreme Court justices 
depending on their circumstances).
15
Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 575 U.S. __ (2015).
16
Wynne v. Comptroller of Maryland, Dkt. No. 16-IN-OO-0216 (Md. Tax 
May 23, 2018).
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attempts to offset the effects of the recent federal 
tax changes in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 115-
97). For example, several states are sponsoring 
“charities” to which residents can contribute and 
then get a federal income tax deduction for the full 
amount in lieu of paying assessed property taxes, 
which are now subject to the federal state and 
local tax deduction limit of $10,000.17 This effort at 
circumventing the clear legislative intent of a tax 
law by attempting to “shoehorn” into acceptable 
behavior that which a legislative body has 
deemed undesirable from a public policy 
perspective is precisely what state governments 
have been railing against for decades; when 
taxpayers engage in such behavior, it is called 
“inappropriate tax planning” or “tax sheltering.” 
How ironic!
II. Murphy, Wayfair, Crutchfield, and Hyatt
Recent cases lead us to believe that states may 
become more unchecked in the exercise of their 
tax powers. The recent U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Murphy v. NCAA concludes merely 
that Congress cannot prohibit a state legislature 
from enacting some types of gambling 
restrictions. The case has nothing to do with a 
state’s right, or non-right, to violate the due 
process and commerce clauses — either the 
common law (that is, due process and dormant 
commerce clause) aspects such as nexus rules or 
statutory aspects, such as the Railroad 
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 
and P.L. 86-272. Nevertheless, based on 
experience and a tad of recent articles,18 we expect 
some states to misread the case (intentionally or 
unintentionally) as saying that states have almost 
unlimited flexibility in enacting their laws, with 
the U.S. Constitution being a mere quaint 
“backdrop.”
Also, in Wayfair, the Court considered South 
Dakota’s law that explicitly ran counter to the 
Quill physical presence rule for sales and use tax 
collection. South Dakota’s win may very well 
embolden other states to disregard other federal 
restrictions that burden them (the Wayfair 
decision makes clear that some prongs of the 
Complete Auto Transit commerce clause test still 
need to be met).
One already-used check on states’ exceeding 
their legal authority and their overall behavior is 
their being subject to suit in a sister state’s court 
for alleged tortious activity. The long-running 
Hyatt case provides a recent example. In Hyatt, an 
inventor sued the California Franchise Tax Board 
for intentional torts and bad-faith conduct 
committed by FTB auditors during audits of the 
inventor. This suit was filed in California’s sister 
state, Nevada. After years of litigation, including 
a trip to the U.S. Supreme Court, Hyatt was 
awarded substantial damages by the Nevada 
courts, and the FTB’s argument that it could not be 
hailed into another state’s courts failed. Stinging 
from this reprimand, the FTB has appealed to the 
U.S. Supreme Court one more time, asking it to 
overturn the rule from Nevada v. Hall that permits 
state actors to be sued in sister state courts. The 
Court granted certiorari at the end of June 2018.
As states pursue aggressive tax assessment 
efforts, taxpayer suits in other states continue to 
be relied on as a check on such behavior.19 For 
example, in Crutchfield Corp. v. Harding, 
Massachusetts has found itself sued in Virginia 
state court over its recently promulgated “cookie 
nexus” regulations. The idea of cookie nexus — 
that the use of in-state software and cookies 
constitutes physical presence — is controversial, 
and Crutchfield, the taxpayer bringing the suit, is 
seeking a declaratory judgment that the 
regulation fails under Quill Corp. v. North Dakota 
and the Internet Tax Freedom Act. Similar to the 
FTB in Hyatt, the Massachusetts Department of 
Revenue is arguing that it should not be able to be 
hailed into Virginia courts.20 Wins by the FTB or 
the Massachusetts DOR on that issue would 
remove a serious protection against unreasonable 
state tax actions.
17
See, e.g., Lauren Loricchio, “State Enacts SALT Deduction Cap 
Workaround for Passthroughs,” State Tax Notes, June 11, 2018, p. 1100; 
and Loricchio, “Second State Enacts SALT Cap Workaround,” State Tax 
Notes, May 14, 2018, p. 746.
18
See, e.g., Daniel Hemel, “Justice Alito, State Tax Hero?” Whatever 
Source Derived (May 15, 2018).
19
See Brief of Indiana and 44 Other States as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Petitioner, Franchise Tax Board of the State of California v. Hyatt, No. 17-
1299, at *8-11 (U.S., filed Apr. 13, 2018).
20
Massachusetts Commissioner of Revenue’s Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of His Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal 
Jurisdiction, Crutchfield Corp. v. Harding, No. CL17001145-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. 
Feb. 15, 2018).
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III. Is There Hope?
Interstate taxpayers have, for years, been 
justifiably wary of having their tax disputes 
adjudicated by state courts in and for the very 
state that is seeking additional revenue (in an 
assessment situation) or protecting revenue (in 
refund situations). As states face fiscal pressures, 
some have resorted to “creative” solutions similar 
to those discussed above. Those solutions are 
harmful to taxpayers and often counter to 
legislated state policy. Also, the multistate tax 
world is in constant evolution. Today’s businesses 
are becoming more fluid and multijurisdictional 
in operation. This mobility in commerce raises 
profound concerns for the multistate taxpayer, 
which must navigate the state tax rules in all the 
states in which it operates — not to mention 
determining whether it is even subject to tax in the 
state to begin with.
To preserve the free flow of commerce 
between the states, the need for consistency and 
uniformity in interstate taxation is paramount. 
Without it, the risk of multistate litigation of the 
same issue is high. In recent years taxpayers like 
Gillette and Newegg.com have litigated the same 
issue in multiple states. Coordinating and 
centralizing such litigation would result in 
obvious efficiencies by removing the need to 
litigate the same issue multiple times and by 
providing consistency and certainty in the state 
tax world.
Therefore, one solution to those concerns 
would be to bring interstate tax disputes to federal 
courts, which may be more capable of achieving 
impartial resolutions as federal judges are further 
removed from state revenue apparatuses. 
Unfortunately, the TIA and the common law 
comity doctrine have presented hurdles for these 
cases reaching federal courts. The TIA prohibits 
federal jurisdiction in state tax matters when a 
“plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had 
in the courts of the State.” The case law applying 
the TIA has treated it as a very high bar for federal 
jurisdiction.21 Likewise, the comity doctrine, 
which the Supreme Court described the TIA as 
partially codifying,22 reflects the “federal 
reluctance to interfere with state taxation”23 and 
generally counsels federal courts against claiming 
jurisdiction over state tax cases when the state 
may have the authority to act.
As the need for uniformity and impartiality in 
state tax disputes grows, Congress should 
address the lack of objectivity at the state court 
level. Not in a substantive way, as pushed for in 
the case of sales and use tax collections, but in a 
procedural one. By repealing the TIA and 
affirmatively granting jurisdiction to the federal 
courts over interstate tax disputes,24 Congress 
could ease the pressure to legislate state tax 
solutions while ensuring that states cannot run 
amok, fearless of consequences in many cases. A 
simple repeal of the TIA would not suffice; the 
affirmative granting of jurisdiction in the federal 
courts is needed to overcome the barriers of the 
comity doctrine. Obviously, there would be 
details to work out, such as the appropriate 
burden of proof and persuasion in state tax 
matters brought to federal courts, but moving 
toward more uniformity and consistency in state 
tax has always been and will continue to be an 
important process for taxpayers, the national 
economy, and states alike. 
21
See, e.g., Levin v. Commerce Energy Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010).
22
Id. at 424.
23
Id.
24
As Rosen and Skelton argued before in, “Desperately Seeking State 
Tax Fairness: The Need for Federal Adjudication,” State Tax Notes, Aug. 
8, 2011, p. 357: “Of the three federal venues available — district courts, 
the Court of Federal Claims, or the Tax Court — the Court of Federal 
Claims presents the best option to achieve the important goal of 
uniformity. . . . Finally, the Court of Federal Claims is a congressional 
court (in contrast to an Article III court), so there are few limitations as to 
what role Congress can give it. As a result, the Court of Federal Claims 
presents the best solution for uniformity, efficiency, and certainty.”
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